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COMMENT
SECRETS ON THE TEXAS-MEXICO
BORDER: LEIVA ET AL. V. RANCH RESCUE
AND RODRIGUEZ ET AL. V. RANCH
RESCUE AND THE RIGHT OF
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS TO BRING SUIT
'Every American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this
fight."
-George W. Bush1 quoted on the Internet
homepage of Ranch Rescue.
On October 29, 2001, President George W. Bush called on the
nation to be "vigilant"2 against terrorism. This call for vigilance
has reinvigorated "vigilante" groups,3 particularly near the United
States southern border with Mexico, an area harboring large
populations of both legal and illegal migrant workers.' Local vigi-
lantes are using this rhetoric to justify the creation of private mili-
tia with the expressed purposes of protecting private property,'
keeping undocumented aliens6 out of the United States,7 and keep-
1. George W. Bush, Photo Opportunity with Homeland Security Counsel
(October 29, 2001). See also Ranch Rescue, http://www.ranchrescue.com (last visited
October 18, 2003).
2. George W. Bush, Speech on Homeland Security at the Center for Disease
Control, Atlanta, GA (November 8, 2001).
3. Chris Simcox, a leader of a vigilante group in Arizona, defined vigilantism as,
"a volunteer committee organized to suppress and punish crimes summarily (as when
the processes of law appear inadequate)." Chris Simcox, Enough is Enough,
Tumbstone Tumbleweed, October 24, 2002, available at http://www.tombstone
tumbleweed.com/chd.htm.
4. See Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, Special Rapporteur, Mission to the Border
Between Mexico and the United States of America, United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, Economic and Social Council 41 - 44 (October 30, 2002).
5. "Private Property First, Foremost, and Always." Ranch Rescue, http:/www.
ranchrescue.com (last visited October 18, 2003); See also Civil Homeland Defense,
available at http://www.civilhomelanddefense.us/; See also American Border Patrol,
available at http://www.americanborderpatrol.com.
6. For this paper, I will refer to persons entering the United States without
Federal documentation as undocumented aliens, See Michael R. Curran, Note,
Flickering Lamp Besides the Golden Door: Immigration, the Constitution, &
Undocumented Aliens in the 1990s, 30 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 57, 62-68 (1998) (full
discussion of labels of Aliens, Immigrants, Natives, Nationals, and Citizens).
7. "Our goal should be to staff the border each and every day, until the issue of
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ing terrorists from entering the United States.8 However, through
their efforts to ostensibly protect the nation, these groups may be
threatening the values for which the United States stands.
Six undocumented aliens are taking action against a group of
aggressive vigilante ranchers who call themselves Ranch Rescue
Texas.' At first glance, this case looks like an ordinary civil action
under state tort laws. The Plaintiffs are bringing suit under tort
claims of assault, false imprisonment, and negligence. However,
even if Defendants are guilty of committing what would ordinarily
be common law torts, Plaintiffs may not have any remedies availa-
ble to them against these violent actors. The question is, whether
an undocumented alien has a private remedy for damages under
state or federal law against a United States citizen?
The answer to this question may surprisingly be no!
As Americans, we take for granted the rights and protections
granted to citizens in the Bill of Rights and the US Constitution.
However, these constitutionally granted rights are the only form
of civil rights and remedies available to persons in the United
States. If a person does not have rights under the Bill or Rights or
the Constitution, they do not have rights within the United States
government. Unlike many of the Western European countries, the
United States does not subscribe to any international human
rights treaties nor international human rights courts.
Though the rights enumerated in the Constitution are public
rights of action, they directly affect private rights as well as the
private right to bring an action in the court system. If the United
States government will not recognize or protect the right of
undocumented aliens to bring suit in the court system, then these
persons are left with no alternative forum to assert the wrongs
committed against them and collect damages for these actions.
the invasion is resolved." Chris Simcox, Enough is Enough, Tumbstone Tumbleweed,
October 24, 2002, available at http://www.tombstonetumbleweed.com/chd.htm. See
also Ranch Rescue, available at http://www.ranchrescue.com (last visited October 18,
2003).
8. Ranch Rescue available at http://www.ranchrescue.com (last visited October
18, 2003).
9. Plaintiffs Original Petition, Discovery Plan and Request for Disclosure, Leiva
et al. v. Ranch Rescue et al. 54 - 58, No. CC-03-77 (229th Dist. Ct. 2003) (on file with
author); Plaintiffs Second Amended Petition, Discovery Plan and Request for
Disclosure, Rodriguez et al. v. Ranch Rescue et al., No. CC-03-126 (229th Dist. Ct.
2003) (on file with author); for purposes of this article, these cases will be referred to
as Leiva and Rodriguez, et al. Please note that on March 4, 2004 the Fourth Amended
Complaint was filed for Leiva et. al. v. Ranch Rescue, No. CC-03-77 (229th Dist. Ct.
2004) (on file with author).
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Furthermore, the Federal Government dominates the laws gov-
erning immigration, meaning the Federal Government retains
control over all aspects of immigration law and the rights of
undocumented aliens."
The extent of rights granted to undocumented aliens inside
the United States is yet to be determined by the federal and state
courts or Congress. Because undocumented aliens fear that if
they speak out against their assailants their illegal presence in
the United States will become known, little case law exists defin-
ing the rights of undocumented persons." The plight of undocu-
mented aliens is further complicated by a lack of resources and
legal forums available to bring legal action. The United States
courts have provided little in the way of assistance. 2
In this article, I will look at the first actions taken by undocu-
mented aliens against vigilante ranchers, Leiva and Rodriguez et
al, 3 and the legal hurdles these Plaintiffs must surmount to bring
this civil action in a United States civil court. The article is
divided into four main parts.
Part I looks at Ranch Rescue and the organization's tactics in
the United States border region to combat migrant travelers. It
also examines the legitimization of these actions through legal
and policy justifications. Part II explores the facts and allegations
in Leiva and Rodriguez et. al. These facts will be used to explain
the points of law in the other sections of this article.
The remaining sections examine the major issues of law aris-
ing from Leiva and Rodriguez et al and similar actions brought by
undocumented aliens. Before a suit can be argued on its merits,
plaintiffs must overcome basic standing issues. Part III discusses
the standing issues faced by undocumented aliens 14 bringing an
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982);
DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S.Ct. 933 (1976).
11. See Jesus A. Trevino, Comment, Border Violence Against Illegal Immigrants
and the Need to Change the Border Patrol's Current Complaint Review Process, 21
Hous. J. INV'L L. 85, 98 (1998); see also Michael Nunez, Note, Violence at Our Border:
Rights and Status of Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence Along the
Border Between the United States and Mexico, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1573, 1577-1578
(1992).
12. See Laura K. Abel and Risa E. Kaufman, Preserving Aliens' and Migrant
Workers'Access to Civil Legal Services: Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 491 (2003) (addiessing restrictions for legal aid groups who receive
funding from the United States government to take cases on behalf of illegal
immigrants).
13. Leiva and Rodriguez et. al., No. CC-03-77 (229th Dist. Ct. 2003)..
14. Plaintiffs were traveling in the United States and in clear violation of Federal
Immigration Laws, specifically 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (1996), stating general penalties for
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action in the United States against private citizens and if these
Plaintiffs will be able to collect the damages they seek in the com-
plaint. This section reviews the constitutional issues raised in
bringing these actions and the possible preclusion of damages due
to Plaintiffs' undocumented status. If Plaintiffs are precluded
from recovering damages, an alternative remedy may be availa-
ble, injunctive relief. Part IV will look at the claim by Plaintiffs
that Ranch Rescue's actions are contrary to § 431.010 of the Texas
Government Code"5 prohibiting the creation of private militia. In
this section, I will also examine the benefits of injunctive relief for
Plaintiffs and the preemption issues of using state laws to govern
immigration.
I. RANCH RESCUE AND OTHER VIGILANTE GROUPS
Ranch Rescue's recruitment brochure states, "Private prop-
erty owners have been threatened, harassed, intimidated, bur-
glarized, and assaulted."", Ironically, these are the same charges
alleged in Leiva and Rodriguez et al. by undocumented aliens
against Ranch Rescue.
Two rivaling philosophies are at war in the border region
between the United States and Mexico. On one hand there is the
hope of immigrant migrant workers crossing the Mexican border
intending to find jobs and a better life in the United States, how-
ever temporarily, and on the other hand, landowners who are
American citizens and fear the intrusion of undocumented aliens
on their private land and the economic and political challenges
these people may bring.'7 Philosophically, the border battle is a
clash between opportunity and security, and the meaning of the
American Dream.
Ranch Rescue is "a volunteer network composed of people who
believe that when government fails or refuses to act, individual
citizens are obliged to act on their own." 8 The organization
entering the United States "at any time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers."
15. TEx. STAT. ANN. § 431.010 (1998).
16. See Ranch Rescue, www.ranchrescue.com (last visited October 19, 2003); see
also Ranch Rescue Texas Volunteer Brochure (on file with author).
17. David McLemore, South Texas Rancher, Protection Group Deny Assaulting
Illegal Immigrants, DALLAS MORMNG NEWS, June 29, 2003, available at 2003 WL
56751025.
18. Ranch Rescue Texas Volunteer Brochure (on file with author); see also Ranch
Rescue, http://www.ranchrescue.com (last visited October 18, 2003) (ranch rescue
operates in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
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describes its militia tactics as actions for the protection of prop-
erty rights,"9 the protection of the United States from terrorist
threats,20 and the protection of American jobs. Ranch Rescue
operates out of private farms, with state chapters in Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington .
21
One such Ranch Rescue volunteer is Ranch owner Joseph
Sutton, a property owner in Southern Texas and a Defendant in
the Leiva and Rodriguez et al actions. Sutton granted Ranch Res-
cue access to his property because he felt the United States Border
Patrol was taking little interest in apprehending trespassing
immigrants; Sutton invited Ranch Rescue to act as voluntary
security guards.22 Based on government statistics, Sutton's and
other vigilante ranchers' concerns are extremely well founded. In
recent years, the amount of immigrant traffic through the south-
ern border areas has increased tremendously. In 2000, over 7 mil-
lion illegal immigrants were reported to reside in the United
States and of this population, an estimated 1 million illegal immi-
grants were believed to be residing in Texas alone.23 Furthermore,
the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to protect the
United States border from terrorists and deter illegal entry are
focused on the Northern United States border with Canada and
not on the Southern border with Mexico. 4 The increases in immi-
gration combined with increased national fears of terrorism have
caused the rise in private militia groups.2 5
Ranch Rescue and its associates deny any wrongdoing in the
recent lawsuits brought by undocumented aliens and argue that




22. Bob Edwards, Morning Edition: Activist groups on the US-Mexico Border
Could Spur More Violence with Illegal Immigrants (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 16,
2003) (on file with author).
23. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Estimates of Unauthorized
Immigrants," 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, at 213 - 217.
24. The Patriot Act contains an entire subtitle devoted to new, enhanced
procedures to protect the Northern boarder; the Southern boarder crisis is not
specially dealt with in the Patriot Act. PATRIOT ACT, PL107-56, 2001 HT 3162. Title
IV-A (2001).
25. See Ranch Rescue at www.ranchrescue.com; American Border Patrol at www.
americanborderpatrol.com; Civil Homeland Defense at www.civilhomelanddefense.
us/.
26. John MacCormack, Volunteer Denies Beating on the Border, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEws, Mar. 22, 2003, available at WWL 15637341.
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Rescue has maintained a perfect record without any criminal con-
victions and a reputation for providing a needed service to the
understaffed United States Border Patrol.17 And, like Ranch Res-
cue, many other groups operate throughout the Southern United
States border region and maintain similarly clean records and
generally good relationships with local border patrol agencies.
However, the more controversial issue is not the public service
these vigilante citizens may provide in helping protect the border,
but what happens when these armed civilians go too far and what
rights undocumented victims have after being attacked.
II. LEIVA ET AL. V. RANCH RESCUE ET AL. 2 8AND RODRIGUEZ
ET. AL. V. RANCH RESCUE ET AL.
2 9
Two separate groups of undocumented alien-travelers are
bringing civil actions against a group of Defendants they encoun-
tered while traveling on foot through Jim Hogg County, Texas, in
March 2003.0 In both actions, civil charges are being filed against
Ranch Rescue, its national spokesman Jack Foote, and Jim Hogg
County ranch owners Joseph Sutton, Henry Mark Conner and
Casey James Nethercott, claiming assault, false imprisonment,
and threats of impending death.3' The civil actions were filed on
May 29, 2003, in Jim Hogg County, Texas, in the 229th Judicial
District of Texas.32 Two of the Defendants, Henry Mark Conner,
Jr. and Casey James Nethercott, are also facing criminal charges
based on actions taken against the Plaintiffs in Leiva et al.33
These lawsuits, the first of their kind, were filed on behalf of
Plaintiffs by the law firm of Ricardo de Anda of Laredo,' Texas,
27. Jon Dougherty, Feds Harassing Citizen Border Groups? Worldnet Daily, Aug.
10, 2003, available at www.worldnetdaily.com/new/article.asp?ARTICLEID=34008
(9/16/03).
28. Plaintiffs Original Petition, Discovery Plan and Request for Disclosure, Leiva
et all (No. CC-03-77).
29. Plaintiffs Second Amended Petition, Discovery Plan and Request for
Disclosure, Rodriguez et al. (No. CC-03-126) (on file with author).
30. Leiva and Rodriguez et. al., No. CC-03-77, No. CC-03-126 (229th Dist. Ct.
2003).
31. Id. See also Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Migrants Sue Paramilitary Group and Rancher for Unlawful Violent Assaults on
Texas Ranch, May 29, 2003, available at http://www.maldef.org/news/press.cfm?
ID=161.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Migrants Sue
Paramilitary Group and Rancher for Unlawful Violent Assaults on Texas Ranch
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Southern Poverty Law Center," the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund,"6 and the law firm of Judge &
Brim, P.C. of Austin, Texas.
In both cases, Plaintiffs allege that armed persons accosted
them at gunpoint while crossing Defendant Joseph Sutton's
ranch. Plaintiffs further allege that while held at gunpoint, the
armed persons verbally abused and terrorized them," including
threatening them that they could be killed without their murders
ever being discovered by authorities." Plaintiffs allege Defendants
detained both groups for approximately two hours.4" In the case of
Leiva et al., Plaintiffs allege Defendants hit one of the Plaintiffs in
the head with the back of a handgun and allowed a Rottweiler dog
to attack another Plaintiff.41 In Rodriguez et al., Defendants alleg-
edly stole $3,000 hidden in one of the traveler's shoes.42 Plaintiffs
claim that during the entire ordeal, they feared severe injury and
death.43 As a result of the incidents, Plaintiffs claim they were
terrified and traumatized, suffering physical injuries and severe
emotional distress.44 Plaintiffs in both actions seek to recover
actual and exemplary damages. 5
Defendant Joseph Sutton responded to the Complaint by
denying all of Plaintiffs' allegations, setting out affirmative
defenses, and alleging new facts arguing against the merits of the
suit.46 Defendants claim citizens of foreign states illegally inside
the United States have no standing to seek monetary relief in the
[hereinafter Migrants Sue Paramilitary Group] (May 29, 2003), available at http://
www.maldef.org/news/press.cfm?ID=161.
35. Id. at 2; See also Southern Poverty Law Center, www.splcenter.org, (last
visited October 18, 2003).
36. Migrants Sue Paramilitary Group, supra note 34, at 2; See also Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, www.maldef.org, (last visited
October 18, 2003).
37. Leiva and Rodriguez et. al, No. CC-03-77, No. CC-03-126 at 91 23, 32.
38. Id. at 22, 25, 31, 32, 37.
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id. at 26, 38.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Rodriguez et al, No. CC-03-126, at T29.
43. Id. at 91 30, 39.
44. Id. at 91 30, 39. Both civil actions allege counts of assault, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and
negligence per se. Id. at 91 41-108.
45. Id. at 91 119-121.
46. Defendant Joseph Sutton's Original Answer, Leiva et al, (No. CC-03-77) (on
file with author); Defendant Joseph Sutton's Original Answer, Rodriguez et. al. ,(No.
CC-03-126) (on file with author) (these documents are virtually identical in form and
substance and therefore I will refer to them together as Defendant Sutton Answer).
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state or federal courts of the United States.47 Defendants also deny
the factual allegations of the complaint because of the affirmative
defense of the common law doctrine of citizen's arrest.48
III. Do THE ILLEGAL MIGRANT TRAVELERS HAVE A RIGHT
TO BRING THIS ACTION?
The courts must initially resolve the issue of whether the ini-
tial crime of entering the United States illegally, a violation of
Federal Immigration Law, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (1996),"9 will pre-
clude Plaintiffs from recovery against Ranch Rescue. If the court
finds this initial violation to preclude any form of civil remedy,
then Plaintiffs have no right to bring these actions.
At first glance, this question appears to be settled. The Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly
states, "no State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."" The
Courts have consistently held that an alien, no matter his status
under the immigration laws, is a person within the meaning and
grants of due process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5'
However, even though the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
seemingly guarantee undocumented aliens the right to equal pro-
tection and due process, the Supreme Court is yet to rule on what
equal protection and due process mean to persons whose presence
inside the United States is based upon a violation of Federal
Laws.2
A. Plyler v. Doe: Does the Supreme Court Define the
Rights of Illegal Aliens?
In Plyler v. Doe,53 the Supreme Court articulated a narrow set
of rights for undocumented aliens. The Court's primary holding,
based on guarantees of equal protection, struck down a Texas
statute allowing school districts to deny illegal-alien children
47. Id. at 3, 11.
48. Id. at 4, 12, 21.
49. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (1996).
50. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (1996).
53. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202.
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access to education, on the basis of equal protection. 54 In the deci-
sion, however, the Court stressed the narrow nature of the ruling,
confining the holding to education. The Court also expressly dis-
tinguished the voluntary nature of the parents' illegal action of
crossing the border from the involuntary action and consequences
to the children, the deprivation of an education.
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support
the view that a State may withhold its beneficence from
those whose very presence within the United States is the
product of unlawful conduct. These arguments do not
apply with the same force to classifications imposing disa-
bilities on the minor children of such illegal entrants."
Plyler, though expressly declaring the Equal Protection
Clause applicable to undocumented aliens and using an equal pro-
tection analysis in its determination that undocumented alien
children are being deprived of equal protection rights, refused to
grant undocumented aliens suspect class status and refused to
define what rights such persons maintain while present in the
United States. The Court stated: "Undocumented aliens cannot be
treated as a suspect class because their presence in this country,
in violation of federal law, is not a 'constitutional irrelevancy."'56
The Court leaves this powerful language to be defined by the
lower courts. The lower courts must decide how substantial the
initial violation of Federal immigration laws is and balance this
violation against the rights granted to "all persons" under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Since Plyler, the lower courts have grappled with the inter-
pretation of the level of equal protection rights available to both
documented and undocumented aliens and the meaning of the
language "constitutional irrelevancy." Each case attempting to
define this terminology and the rights of undocumented aliens
against the state has read Plyler in its most limited form and held
the discriminating statute is not a violation of the equal protection
clause." Initially seen as a victory for undocumented aliens, Ply-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 219 - 220.
56. Id. at 223.
57. See John Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Dept. of Public Safety, 147 F. Supp.2d. 1369
(N.D. Ga. 2001) (Georgia law restricting issuance of Georgia driver's licenses to illegal
aliens did not violate equal protection or right to travel); State of Alaska Department
of Revenue, Permanent Fund Division v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993) (holding
the equal protection clause was not violated when the state excluded an
2004] 413
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ler has been used in its most narrow form by the lower courts,
affording few constitutional protections to undocumented aliens.
As applied to Leiva and Rodriguez et al, the Plyler analysis
offers Plaintiffs- little chance for obtaining relief. Plaintiffs were
illegally and voluntarily crossing the border into the United
States at the time of the alleged assaults and furthermore, the
alleged assaults occurred during Plaintiffs' violation of 8 U.S.C.A.
§1325 (1996). Additionally, the Supreme Court has cited Plyler for
the premise that the only aliens able to receive constitutional pro-
tections are those who have "developed substantial contacts with
this country."58 At the time of the attacks, Plaintiffs' contacts with
the United States were limited to a secretive and illegal entrance
across the Mexican border only a few miles from the Sutton farm.
Under Plyler and its progeny, the determination of Plaintiffs'
rights falls within the Court's discretion to determine the extent of
the Constitutional relevancy of the Plaintiffs' Immigration Law
violations against Plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
rights under the Constitution. Using the Plyler analysis, these
violations may be seen by the court as significant enough to trump
Plaintiffs ability of to bring a private action for damages.
B. The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
National Labor Relations Board in Defining
Remedies for Undocumented Aliens.
The Supreme Court revisited the status of undocumented
aliens in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board, holding an undocumented worker could not col-
lect damages for his employer's violations of the National Labor
Rights Act (NLRA).59 The Court primarily based this decision on
Sure-Tan v. National Labor Relations Board, holding an illegal
alien employees' remedies in a labor dispute must be "conditioned
upon the employees' legal re-admittance to the United States.""
The Court also stated reasons based upon Congressional intent
undocumented alien inmate from access to a drug treatment program based primarily
upon his alien status); People v. Arciga, 227 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Cal. App. 5th 1986) (Court
used a narrow Plyler analysis to uphold a state statue denying illegal aliens financial
assistance from the state, limiting Plyler to grants of educational opportunities).
58. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 49 U.S. 259, 270 (1990).
59. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. National Labor Relations Board, 122
S.Ct. 1275 (2002) (abrogating N.L.R.B. v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134
F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997) and Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 795
F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986)).
60. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 104 S.Ct. 2803 (1984).
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and legislation for its decision and expansion of the Sure-Tam
precedent:
By allowing the Board to award back pay to illegal aliens
would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions
critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.
It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension
by immigrant authorities, condone prior violations of immi-
gration laws, and encourage future violations."'
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19862 was enacted to
discourage employers from hiring undocumented aliens. The Con-
gressional purpose in enacting the statue is the belief that
"employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally...
employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from
hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from
entering illegally or violating their status in search of employ-
ment."63 The Court defends the Hoffman decision to be inline with
this Congressional reasoning.
The Supreme Court's decision is in direct contradiction to the
National Labor Relations Board's [NLRB] reasoning to grant
plaintiff Jose Castro back-pay for Hoffman Compounds' violations
of the NLRA. The Board reasoned, "the most effective way to
accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in
IRCA is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to
undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employ-
ees."6 The Hoffman dissent written by Justice Breyer, in which
three other Justices joined, follows the same line of reasoning
articulated by the NLRB15 Furthermore, the dissent emphasizes
the discretion of the NLRB to determine the appropriate remedy
in addressing violations of the NLRA.'
Hoffman is compelling in understanding the direction the
Court is taking in immigration cases. Because the case is distin-
guishable from Leiva and Rodriguez et al, in that it is based on
labor laws and the equitable remedy of back pay, the critical
61. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc, 122 S.Ct. at 1284.
62. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
63. H.R. REP. 99-682(I) at 46 (July 16, 1986).
64. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 1279 (quoting Hoffman Plastic
Compounds and Casimiro Arauz, 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1998 WL 663933 *1 (N.L.R.B.
September 23, 1998)).
65. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 1285.
66. Id. at 1285 - 6, citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Col, 395 U.S. 575, 612, n. 32
(1969) (Board "draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice
of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.").
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implications of the case are not necessarily only those articulated
in the holding. Instead, the importance of the case for Leiva and
Rodriguez et. al. is in the powerful dicta and the express inten-
tions of the Court in rendering the opinion. The dicta and holding
of Hoffman show the Court's direction towards precluding illegal
aliens from the right to damages due to their initial violations of
the Federal Immigration Laws.
It is especially interesting to note that in the wake of Hoff-
man, state courts and lower federal courts are uniformly refusing
to render decisions consistent with the Hoffman holding and rea-
soning. In the case of Cano v. Mallory Management (2003), the
New York Supreme Court stated, "every case citing Hoffman since
it was rendered has either distinguished itself from it or has lim-
ited it greatly.""7 Defendants, in both state and federal courts,
have attempted to use Hoffman to quench civil suits brought by
undocumented aliens, arguing that as a result of the initial viola-
tion of the Federal Immigration Laws, plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring suit." In a recent case Singh v. Jutla & C.D. &
R's Oil, Inc., a California Federal Court limited Hoffman to only
claims for back pay and allowed an undocumented alien employee
to bring suit for retaliatory damages against his employer. 9
Singh recovered over $200,000 in damages. °
The sheer volume of cases since Hoffman was rendered is also
67. Cano v. Mallory Management, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 816, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)
citing Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y., 2002);
Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, No. 00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471 (N.D. Ill.
September 13, 2002); Rodriguez v. Texan, Inc., No. 01 C 1478, 2002 WL 3161237
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2002); Flores v. Nissen, 213 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
Medoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, (9th Cir. 2002); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM
(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
68. See Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, No. CIV.A.02-2685, 2003 WL
22129459 at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2003) (indicating Spartan argues in reliance of
Hoffman that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Title VII because Escobar was not
a documented worker at the time he was employed by defendant, Spartan.); Cano, 760
N.Y.S. 2d at 818 (attempting expansion of holding in Hoffman to dismiss the
plaintiffs complaint for tortuous conduct because he is an "illegal alien); United
States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp 809, 818 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing Hoffman,
the government supported an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)); Martinez v.
Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Defendants argue that as per
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., plaintiffs, as undocumented aliens, are precluded
from recovering the remedies they seek under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Protection Act (MPSA)).
69. Singh v. Jutla & C. D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 1056, 1060-1061
(N.D.Cal.2002).
70. Foreign Worker Wins Retaliation Case After Uncle Reports Him to the INS
(National Public Radio, Jan. 21, 2004), available at 2004 WL 56911222.
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an indication of the confusion occurring in the lower courts in
applying the opinion." The majority of the confusion stems from
the dicta in the Hoffman decision, that awarding damages to an
illegal immigrant not only trivializes the immigration laws but
also condones and encourages future violations. 2 Another result
of the Hoffman case is the possible far reaching implications of the
Court's expansion of the ruling in Sure-Tan, Inc., v. National
Labor Relations Board,3 restricting back pay damages to all
undocumented workers, not just workers who are deported before
the court's decision is rendered. 4 Many experts in immigration
law, including the NLRB, firmly believe the decision in Hoffman
threatens to do the exact opposite of what the Court intended.
Instead of maintaining the integrity of IRCA, they believe the
decision will likely undermine the Act by encouraging an
employer to hire undocumented workers. 5
The courts in Texas are following the trend of other lower
courts and distinguishing cases brought by undocumented aliens
from Hoffman. The Court of Appeals of Texas held in the case
Tyson Foods Inc., v. Guzman (2003), that Texas law does not
require United States citizenship or the possession of immigration
work authorization permits as a prerequisite to recovering dam-
ages for lost earning capacity."' Defendant Tyson Foods cited the
case of Hoffman for the proposition that "national public policy, as
expressed by the United States Congress in enacting immigration
reforms, militates against any award of damages to undocu-
71. Elizabeth Baldwin, Note, Damage Control: Staking Claim to Employment Law
Remedies for Undocumented Immigrant Workers After Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc., 27 SEAULR 233, 251 - 252 (Summer 2003).
72. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 1284.
73. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. 883.
74. Eric Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, 39-MAR
JTLATRIAL 46 (2003) ("Federal and state employments laws generally apply to
[undocumented] workers, regardless of their immigration status. But last year in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court raised serious question
about what remedies will be available to alien workers who lack work
authorization.").
75. Elizabeth Baldwin, Note, Damage Control: Staking Claim to Employment Law
Remedies for Undocumented Immigrant Workers After Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc., 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 233, 251 - 2 (Summer 2003); See also, Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1279 (2002) (reversing the NLRB's grant of back pay to
undocumented alien employee); citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds and Casimiro
Arauz, 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1998 WL 663933 at *1 (N.L.R.B. September 23, 1998) (the
Board determined that "the most effective way to accommodate and further the
immigration policies embodied in [IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of
the [NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same manner as other employees.").
76. Tyson Foods Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Ct. App. TX 2003).
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mented alien laborers."77 The Texas Court of Appeals, using an
extremely limited application of Hoffman, stated the holding "only
applies to an undocumented alien worker's remedy for an
employer's violation of the NLRA and does not apply to common-
law personal injury damages."78 Tyson is the only Texas case dis-
tinguishing Hoffman and therefore, important precedent as to
how undocumented aliens will be treated under Texas laws. The
Tyson precedent should be used by the Hogg County Court to hold
that the Plaintiffs' are eligible to receive the damages they seek in
the complaint.
How are these lower courts able to distinguish their holdings
from the Supreme Court's precedent set in Hoffman? One answer
may be that back pay is an equitable remedy and therefore, is
guided by the maxim "he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands." Thus, while "'equity does not demand that its suit-
ors have led blameless lives,' as to other matters, it does require
that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to
the controversy in issue.""
All undocumented aliens working in the United States are in
clear violation of IRCA and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 governing improper
entry by aliens into the United States. Therefore, no undocu-
mented person can enter a United States court with clean hands
as to status in the United States, precluding all forms of equitable
relief. Furthermore, the NLRB extended the holding in Hoffman
by taking the position that undocumented persons who have been
unlawfully discharged are precluded from back pay under the
NLRA "regardless of the circumstances of their hire.""
The lower court decisions mentioned above have uniformly
distinguished cases from Hoffman upon the form of relief sought
by the undocumented alien plaintiffs. Many of these remedies
sought are under state workers compensation laws and the Fed-
eral Labor Standards Act (FLSA),8' which is not a doctrine of equi-
77. Id at 243.
78. Id at 244.
79. Precision Instruments Mfr. Co. et al. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (quoting Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229
(1934); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933);
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) § 397-399).
80. Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Note, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving
Undocumented Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws? 6 HARv.
LATINO. L. REV. 119 (Spring 2003) (page numbers not cited, page 8) citing Gen. Couns.
Mem. 02-06 (NLRB July 19, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1730518 * 3 (modifying Gen.
Couns. Mem. 98-15 (NLRB Dec. 4, 1998)).
81. See Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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table relief and is regulated under the state's authority by state
police powers.2 In addition, the clean hands doctrine is not appli-
cable to remedies at law, such as tort or retaliatory damages.
Therefore, on this basis, the lower courts have been able to cir-
cumvent the Supremacy Clause issue of not following a Supreme
Court decision.
Hoffman itself states, "undocumented employees are still
entitled to the NLRB's 'traditional remedies."'83 Lower courts have
also used this language to grant non-equitable remedies under
state law. Lower court decisions have distinguished "between
awards of post-termination back pay for work not actually per-
formed and awards of unpaid wages."84 In Tyson Foods, the Texas
Appellate court distinguished Hoffman from a state-law claim
stating Hoffman "does not apply to common-law personal injury
damages" and instead such remedies are guided by state law."3
Similarly, the Plaintiffs in Levia and Rodriguez et. al. are seeking
relief under state common law and, similar to the cases cited
above, Plaintiffs' claims are not precluded by Hoffman. The dam-
ages sought are most closely analogous to Cano v. Mallory Man-
agement in which plaintiff brought a tort action of negligence. The
court distinguished Hoffman based upon the state police powers to
regulate tortuous conduct.8" Furthermore, the tortuous conduct of
Defendants falls outside the purpose of the IRCA's attempts to
control and punish undocumented aliens attaining employment in
the United States. 87 Based on this analysis, Plaintiffs should not
be precluded from the right to sue for damages under the current
reading of Hoffman.
However, the policy language of Hoffman is clear regarding
the majority's decision to deny damages to plaintiffs based upon
their initial violations of Federal Immigrations Law. Based upon
the Court's intent, Plaintiffs remain on unstable footing. How-
82. See Safeharbor Employer Services I, Inc., v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984,
986 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 2003); citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
83. See Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal.
2002) citing Hoffman, 22 S.Ct. 1275, 1286.
84. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karen International, Inc., 207 F. Supp.2d 191, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.
2003).
85. Tyson Foods, Inc., 116 S.W. 3d at 244.
86. o Cano v. Mallory Management, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 816, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
87. "The bill would prohibit the employment of aliens who are unauthorized to
work in the United States... U.S. employers who violate this prohibition would be
subject to civil and criminal penalties." H.R. REP.99-682(I), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.5649
at 5650.
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ever, since state courts are not following the precedent set by the
Court in Hoffman, and are uniformly distinguishing cases with
similar facts by the form of relief sought, the Supreme Court may
decide to clarify its holding. If this is the case, then Leiva and
Rodriguez et al are an extremely vulnerable target. The cases
have already received large amounts of media attention and factu-
ally involve suits for damages in which the initial breach of federal
law directly resulted in the torts upon which the suits are based.
IV. ACTIONS OF PRIVATE MILITIA
Under the count of negligence per se, Plaintiffs allege Defend-
ants owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs under § 431.010 of the Texas
Government Code.8 Plaintiffs are bringing this allegation as part
of an overall claim for damages. Tort litigation for damages can
be a powerful remedy for private individuals and public interest
groups to speak out against vigilante groups like Ranch Rescue,
particularly when the groups are under funded and the damage
awards are high. However, only seeking damages limits Plaintiffs
from the immediate relief necessary to stop the vigilante tactics of
Ranch Rescue and similar patrol groups. 9 Injunctive relief under
§ 431.010 of the Texas Government Code would seem to be an
extremely effective vehicle to stopping the terror and human
rights violations in the border region.
Section § 431.010 of the Texas Government Code90 prohibits
the organization of private militia:
A body of persons other than the regularly organized state
military forces or the troops of the United States may not
associate as a military company or organization or parade
in public with firearm in a municipality of the state.
The purpose of the Texas statute against organized militia is to
provide for the public safety and to protect citizens from the threat
of violence. 1 The history of this statute and similar anti-militia
88. TEx. CODE. ANN. § 431.010 (1998),
89. Chief trial counsel Morris Dees stated, "If these groups and ranchers who
conspire with them have to pay through their pockets, they will think twice before
attacking innocent and peaceful migrants." Migrants, Attacked on Texas Ranch, Sue
Vigilantes for Violent Assault, Southern Poverty Law Center, May 29, 2003, available
at http://www.splcenter.org/legallnews/article.jspaid=10&site-area=l.
90. TEx. CODE. ANN. § 431.010 (1998).
91. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.




laws existing in twenty-four states92 dates back to the Supreme
Court decision in Presser v. Illinois (1886), holding state anti-mili-
tia laws "do not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear
arms."93 In Presser, the Court acknowledged the power of state
governments to "control and regulate the organization, drilling,
and parading of military bodies and associations.., the exercise of
this power by the states is necessary to the public peace, safety,
and good order."94
State anti-militia laws have been successfully used in a vari-
ety of cases for injunctive relief in private actions against groups
such as the Klu Klux Klan, 95 various groups of "unorganized mili-
tia,"" and in cases brought to restrict citizens' right to hold guns.97
Anti-militia laws are based on the protection of public safety, not
at preventing anti-government groups from communicating their
views."
To determine if a group like Ranch Rescue can be held liable
under § 431.010 of the Texas Government Code requires clarifica-
tion of the line between an organization's illegal "association as a
military company or organization"9 and legal freedom of expres-
sion granted by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien,
though factually based upon defendant's conviction for burning
his selective service registration certificate, is cited for the ele-
ments used to determine if a regulation of expressive conduct vio-
92. Ellen M. Bowden and Morris S. Deed, An Ounce of Prevention: The
Constitutionality of State Anti-Militia Laws, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 523, 525 (1997)
(Symposium: Race Relations and Conflict in the United States); See ALA. CODE § 31-2-
125 (1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26- 123 (West 1991); FLA. STAT. CH. 870.06 (1994);
GA. CODE ANN § 38-2-277 (Harrison 1995); IDAHO CODE § 46-802 (1977); 20 ILL COMP.
STAT. 1805/94 (West 1993); IOWA CODE § 29A.31 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-203
(1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.440 (Banks-Baldwin 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT.
37-B, § 342.2 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. § 624.61 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 33-1-31
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.080 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111:15 (1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 127A-151 (1986 & Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-01-21 (1984); N.Y.
MIL. LAw § 240 (McKinney 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws § 30-12-7 (1994); TEx. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 431.010 (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 38.40.120 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 15-
IF-7 (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-106 (Michie 1996).
93. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-5 (1886).
94. Id at 267-8.
95. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n, 543 F.Supp. at 198.
96. United States v. Haney ,264 F.3d 1161 (2001).
97. Silveira v. Lockyer, 238 F.3d 567 (2003).
98. Bowden and Deed, supra note 92, at 525.
99. TEx CODE ANN. § 431.010, State Militia, Organization Prohibited (Vernon's
1987).
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lates the First Amendment freedom of speech.'O° O'Brien states:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial government interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.''
Texas Statute § 431.010 was specifically upheld as constitutional
in Vietnamese Fisherman's Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan. 102
The conduct of Ranch Rescue must be distinguished from the
group's speech and message. Militia members "remain free to
express their views by means other than the threat of military
force."' However, the use of force and military style tactics noto-
riously used by Ranch Rescue are the premise of these suits and
therefore, fit within the prohibitions of § 431.010 of the Texas
Government Code.
Plaintiffs must also show Defendants are militia within the
meaning of the statute. In the case of Vietnamese Fisherman, an
expert for the plaintiff testified to the definition of militia organi-
zation: "any unit command structure, training and discipline so as
to function as a combat or combat support unit."1 0 4 The court used
this definition and determined the Knights of the Klu Klux Klan
were a military organization. The court also used the judicial
rules of construction to interpret the scope of the Texas statute."5
In this analysis, the court concluded that Article 5780(6), cur-
rently called § 431.010 of the Texas Government Code, makes ille-
gal: "(1) individuals associating as a military company; (2)
individuals associating as a military organization; and (3) individ-
100. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Bowden and Deed, supra
note 92, at 528.
101. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 -377.
102. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (The Court did an O'Brien analysis of the Texas statue: (1) State
of Texas may pursuant to its policing power enact and enforce laws to provide for the
public safety and to protect its citizens from the threat of violence; (2) article 5790(6)
was enacted to further the governmental interest of protecting citizens from the
threat of violence posed by private military organizations-the proliferation of private
military organizations threatens to result in lawlessness and destructive chaos; (3)
article 5780(6) is unrelated to the suppression of free expression as it in no way limits
defendants from expressing any view point they desire.)
103. Id. at 209.
104. Id. at 203.
105. Id. at 217.
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uals parading in public with firearms in any city or town in
Texas"; these alternatives are treated as separate violations.' 6
Defendant Sutton denies Ranch Rescue used force or weapons
against trespassers. 1'0 However, both complaints in Leiva and
Rodriguez et al. specifically allege the usage of guns to detain
Plaintiffs,"8 the usage of guns by all Defendants, including Sut-
ton,' 9 the usage of a gun to assault Plaintiff Mancia '" 0 and, in the
case of Leiva et al., Defendant Nethercott told Plaintiffs that their
assailants were United States soldiers who were protecting the
border."' Both complaints state Defendants were wearing mili-
tary fatigues and using military style equipment."' Furthermore,
the entire equipment section of Ranch Rescue's website is dedi-
cated to various forms of weapons available to members and weap-
ons needed by members already engaged in Ranch Rescue
operations."' These are clear examples of Ranch Rescue associat-
ing "as a military company""'4 against the provisions of § 431.010
of the Texas Government Code.
Ranch Rescue's actions also fit within the stated purpose of
the anti-militia statutes, "to provide for the public safety and to
protect its citizens from the threat of violence."115 Ranch Rescue
members patrol in the darkness of the night. The actions of the
group threaten the safety of all persons within the vicinity of
Ranch Rescue's patrols."' Neighbors, who are also landowners,
live in greater fear of Ranch Rescue then of the undocumented
106. Id.
107. Defendant Joseph Sutton Answer, No. CC-03-77, No. CC-03-126, at % 5 and 13.
108. "Ranch Rescue associates were well-armed and well-equipped... Members of
the paramilitary units were armed with high-powered assault rifles and handguns
and were equipped with night-vision devices, two-way radios, flares, machetes,
binoculars, observation posts, all terrain vehicles, and a railing dog trained to attack
humans. Members of the paramilitary units of Ranch Rescue wore camouflaged
uniforms and were required to carry firearms." See Leiva and Rodriguez et al., supra
note 9, at '1 21.
109. Id. at T 25-26 and 32.
110. Id. at 34.
111. Id. at 34.
112. Id. at 22-40.
113. See Ranch Rescue Equipment, available at www.ranchrescue.com/equipment.
htm (last visited February 15, 2004).
114. TEX. CODE ANN. § 431.010 (1998).
115. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198, 216 (S.D. Tex, 1982).
116. Jim Hogg County Prosecutor Rudy Gutierrez stated, "the concern we have is
that these private vigilant groups are going to overreact, end up shooting somebody
that doesn't need to be shot." Bob Edwards, Morning Edition: Activist Groups on the
US-Mexico Border Could Spur More Violence with Illegal Immigrants (NPR radio
broadcast Sept. 16, 2003).
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aliens crossing the border.'17
For Plaintiffs to seek an injunction and sue under § 431.010 of
the Texas Government Code, Plaintiff must use the Texas laws
regarding private enforcement of public statutes. Individuals can
bring an action under a Texas statute by a showing of special
injury, damage, or harm."' This "special injury" standard applies
even in cases in which the act sought to be enjoined violates penal
statutes for which the state might have the clearest interest in
asserting." 9 Plaintiffs can allege "special injury" due to Defend-
ants' specific intent to parade against members of Plaintiffs' class.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs and other persons within Plaintiffs' class
allegedly suffered physical injury, emotional harm, and continu-
ing fear. This injury is not directed nor felt by the general public,
but instead limited to the Plaintiffs and persons in similar
positions.
By suing for an injunction, Plaintiffs may be able to bypass
addressing issues of standing, particularly because they will not
be asking for personal damages. In Hoffman, the Court distin-
guished between other remedies and the remedy of back pay
requested by the plaintiff and determined that "lack of authority
to award back pay does not mean that the employer gets off scot-
free." 2" Though injunctive relief, like back pay, is an equitable
remedy, the undocumented immigrants have clean hands in
regard to § 431.010 of the Texas Government Code because they
did not either provoke the assaults or contribute to the organiza-
tion of Ranch Rescue as a private militia company.' By using
alternative forms of relief such as § 431.010 of the Texas Govern-
ment Code, where Plaintiffs do not monetarily profit from the
results or where Plaintiffs' own conduct does not come into ques-
tion, Plaintiffs may be able to avoid addressing the issues of
117. See id. Rancher Robert Fulbright stated, "Ranch Rescue scares the hell out of
me."
118. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n, 543 F. Supp. at 211-2 ) (citing Scott v. Board of
Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966) (defining special injury as: "persons
aggrieved," "party in interest," person "whose rights are substantially affected," and
persons having "special interest in the subject matter"). Plaintiffs' claims clearly fall
within this standard.
119. Id. at 211; citing Scott, 405 S.W.2d at 56.
120. NLRB v. Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002).
121. Precision Instruments Mfr. Co. et al. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); quoting Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229
(1934); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933);
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) § 397-399.Equity does not demand that its
suitors have led blameless lives,' as to other matters, it does require that they shall
have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue."
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standing and stop the actions of Ranch Rescue and similar vigi-
lantes "guarding" the Texas border.
There may, however, be one other hurdle blocking a suit by
Plaintiffs under § 431.010 of the Texas Government Code. That
hurdle is one of federal preemption over immigration and natural-
ization.'22 In Hoffman, the Court stated that rewarding back pay
to an undocumented alien through the labor laws would, "unduly
trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal
immigration policy."'23 It has long been established that "when
the national government by treaty or statute has established rules
and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or bur-
dens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of
the land.""2 4
In Leiva and Rodriguez et. al., the law governing the entrance
of aliens into the United States is U.S.C.A. § 1325. This statute
falls under the general penalty provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and is a broad prohibition against the illegal
entrance of undocumented persons into the United States. A state
court may determine that due to this broad federal prohibition,
the federal government has taken preemptive action in governing
undocumented persons on the border. Such a ruling would also
place the members of Ranch Rescue into the federal domain, since
they too are interfering with the federal government's border
patrol function. A court may determine that federal law should
govern the consequences to Ranch Rescue' actions; under federal
law, there are no provisions similar to § 431.010 of the Texas Gov-
ernment Code.
"The test of whether both federal and state regulations may
operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superin-
tendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or
different objectives.' ' 25 Enforcement of § 431.010 of the Texas
Government Code by the Texas court in Leiva and Rodriguez et.
al. would reinforce federal control over immigration law and clear
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4; See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-380 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,418-420(1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1941);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
123. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151.
124. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-3.
125. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217 (1963); See
also Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 833 F.2d 570, 573 (5th
Cir. 1987).
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the border of private militia, thereby leaving the region under the
control of the federal authorities.126 Injunctive relief would not
only provide security to the border region, but would also allow
more effective federal control of the United States border and the
immigration challenges in the region.
V. CONCLUSION
According to Ranch Rescue: "We are not, however, obligated
in any way to other private citizens or groups, nor to any foreign
national, government, entity or representative. Specifically, we
are not obligated in any way to cater to the wishes of any foreign
nation, nor the wishes of anyone from the United Nations.
Neither is any other citizen within these United States."127 Should
the United States Government tolerate such lawlessness and dis-
regard for the established laws of this country? America as a
nation becomes hypocritical in its attempt to abolish similar
human rights violations and anarchy elsewhere when it is uncon-
trolled at home.
Unlike the European Nations who are parties to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights,12 the United States is only a party
to the United Nations Counsel of Human Rights.129 There is no
International Court available to hear complaints similar those of
the Plaintiffs' in Levia and Rodriguez et. al. Therefore, it is essen-
tial for the courts in the United States to firmly assert common
law rules governing the rights of all persons within the United
States' borders - even those who are present illegally.
The issue of standing for undocumented aliens will eventually
come down to a question of pre-emption. Does the federal immi-
gration law, 8 U.S.C.A. §1325, preempt the state common law vio-
lations allegedly committed by Defendants? Additionally, does the
violation of federal immigration laws preclude Plaintiffs from the
recovery of damages which resulted from these violations? In Ply-
ler,30 the Court refused to specify the extent of the rights granted
to undocumented aliens and, since this decision, the Supreme
Court has continued to rule narrowly on similar legal questions.
126. See Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 229 (reinforcing the power of the States to deter the
influx of persons entering the United States agaisnt federal law).
127. Ranch Rescue, available at http://www.ranchrescue.com.
128. Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, available at www.
echr.coe.int/.
129. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
130. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Leiva and Rodriguez et al. represent an opportunity for the Court
to look at a broader range of rights and to balance immigration
law violations against basic human freedoms.
As the number of undocumented aliens in the United States
increases, it is becoming more and more important to define the
rights of this population. On January 7, 2004, President Bush pro-
posed a new temporary worker program allowing approximately
eight million illegal immigrants to obtain legal status as tempo-
rary workers in the United States."' The expressed purpose of the
program is to "allow workers who currently hold jobs to come out
of hiding and participate legally in America's economy while not
encouraging further illegal behavior.'1 2 Though this legislative
attempt may help to decrease border violence by "promoting com-
passion for unprotected workers" and bringing to the surface "the
underclass of workers, afraid and vulnerable to exploitation,"133
the program will still not resolve the basic issue of what rights are
held byi undocumented aliens inside the United States.
Until now, the actions of Ranch Rescue and other vigilante
groups have been accepted in their communities. The vigilantes
believed their victims had little to no recourse against actions of
violence in the courts. If these suits are eventually successful, the
ultimate outcome will be that crimes against any person within
the borders of the United States will not go uninvestigated or
unpunished.
BROOKE H. Russ*
131. Bush Calls for Changes on Illegal Workers, CNN Inside Politics, Jan. 8, 2004,
available at, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/07/bushimmigrationindex.
html (last visited 2/15/04).
132. Presidential Fact Sheet, available at, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/01/20040107-1.html
133. Id.
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